

C/SB

DISPATCH

S E C R E T

## PROCESSING ACTION

TO	Chief, Soviet Bloc Division	XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief, European Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, Germany		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
			MICROFILM

SUBJECT REDTOP AEABYSS

① Meeting with AEABYSS/1 and Termination

## ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

REFERENCE: EGNA 33189

1. AEABYSS/1 returned to the FRG as scheduled from IDENTITY/1 on 19 March, and was met for four hours on 14 April at the home of [ ] With this last trip, Subject completed his FJSTEAL assignment. There are no current plans by his employer for his return to FJSTEAL, nor is Subject willing to undertake another assignment there in the near future. We obtained some positive information from our debriefing, which we are forwarding through reports channels.

2. With the conclusion of this case, we would like to reflect briefly on the scope and value of this operation. Although it had an almost seven year run, the operation required only a minimum of case officer time. Meetings with AEABYSS/1 were often held no more frequently than three times a year, and since he accepted no money, our financial outlay was minimal. During the first years of the operation, AEABYSS/1 was given fairly extensive briefings, generally on aircraft recognition, and observation of missile associated parts. Later, he also received more specific requirements relating to his installation and to targets in cities to which he had access. His reporting was best when it related to the installation at which he worked, but we presume that this information had only marginal value. His reporting of observations made while traveling, or in cities in which he resided, possibly contributed

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005  
Dated 4 May 67

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GROUP I - Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and declassification.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGNA 34061	DATE APR 27 1967 27 April 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER [ ] [ ]

DISPATCH

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EGNA 34061

in some measure to the needs of the intelligence community. In our judgement, the main value of AEABYSS/1 was in having him in a sense staked out in an area of FJSTEAL that was not on commonly traveled routes for foreigners. As a briefed and trained observer he would have been able to report on any unusual events and activities, and while he presumably had no exciting encounters, it should not detract from the potential value he represented.

3. The limitations and restrictions imposed on foreigners in FJSTEAL are only too well known, and must seriously be taken into account in judging this type of operation. At our last meeting AEABYSS/1 again emphasized this point by describing the security measures that were taken when he flew from IDENTITY/1 to IDENTITY/2. He was always taken to his plane ahead of other passengers and assigned a seat on the aisle. He was met at his destination, and taken directly to his plant site. We already reported the measures taken to avoid observation of the priority target in Identity/1, which was almost on the road of Subject's daily trips to his place of work. Also, the fact that his knowledge of the activity at the combine within which he worked is so poor further bears out the high degree of security measures taken. The same limitations apply to personal contacts. During all the years that Subject worked in FJSTEAL, he had never visited the home of his indigenous colleagues. The isolation of Subject and of the other foreign technicians was almost total, except for some romantical attachments to maids and cleaning women in the town where Subject resided. We have no doubt that these also were under some form of control.

4. Despite the limitations, the AEABYSS operation provided a return to us more than equal to our investment. We have profited to a considerable degree from the insights the operation afforded into a specific construction effort in FJSTEAL by a foreign company. The value of a trained observer in place can not be overlooked, nor can it be denied that had we required an agent to carry out necessary tasks, we would have had the possibility to accomplish such requirements. It is also clear from this operation that the proximity of an agent to targets of priority interest does not of itself assure sufficient access to obtain information of value. In such cases it is the unexpected development that can change the entire complexity of an operation, but for which, again, the agent in place is essential.

5. Since AEABYSS/1 is not planning to return to FJSTEAL, and since we had maintained contact with him only on matters connected with his FJSTEAL assignments, we have advised him that our relationship was terminated. Over the years we had developed good personal relationships with both AEABYSS/1 and the cut-out, [ ] which would make it possible for us, or anyone using our alias, [ ], or that of our predecessor, [ ] as [ ] to resume contact. Specific instructions and recontact arrangements will be maintained by the Station as is normally done for terminated agents.

APPROVED: [ ]

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGNA 34061
<p style="text-align: center;">SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT</p> <p style="text-align: center;">IDENTITY LIST</p> <p>IDENTITY/1 - SALAVAT</p> <p>IDENTITY/2 - UFA</p>		
FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PAGE NO. 1 of 1 <input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED

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